| Author |
Baland, Jean-Marie.
|
| Subject |
Natural resources -- Management.
|
| Alt Name |
Platteau, J. P. (Jean-Philippe), 1947-
|
|
Oxford University Press.
|
| Description |
1 online resource (423 pages) |
|
monochrome rdacc |
| Summary |
This text aims to bridge the gap between the empirical literature, documenting efforts at managing local-level resources, and the quickly growing body of theoretical knowledge dealing with natural resource management. |
| Note |
Print version record. |
| Bibliography Note |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Contents |
List of Figures; List of Tables; Introduction; PART I: RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF LOCAL-LEVEL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC THEORY; 1. Natural Resources and Economic Growth: Towards a Definition of Sustainability; 1.1 Production and exhaustibility; 1.2 Justifying a conservationist strategy; 1.3 Sustainability and reproducibility; 1.4 Sutainability and individual rationality; 1.5 Conclusion; 2. The Tragedy of the Commons; 2.1 A preliminary statement of the problem; 2.2 The problem of open access; 2.3 The problem of common property |
|
2.4 Co-ordination failure under common property2.5 The conjectural variations approach; 2.6 The Lindahl equilibrium; 3. The Property Rights School Solution: The Privatization Programme; 3.1 The position of the Property Rights School; 3.2 The efficiency of the privatization programme; 3.3 The distributive impact of privatization; 4. The Unregulated Common Property: The Prisoner's Dilemma Revisited; 4.1 The role of private contracting: lessons from the Coase theorem; 4.2 The role of decentralized punishment: spontaneous co-operation in repeated PD games |
|
5. Co-ordination and Leadership in the Unregulated Common Property: Some Lessons from Game Theory5.1 Unilateral contribution; 5.2 Co-ordinated contributions; 5.3 Heterogeneous situations with PD, AG, and CG players; 5.4 Conclusion; 6. Moral Norms and Co-operation; 6.1 Norms as constraints on the pursuit of self-interest; 6.2 Norms as social devices shaping preferences and expectations; 6.3 Considerations shout the emergence and erosion of moral norms; 7. The Possibility of Co-operation: Lessons from Experimental Social Psychology; 7.1 Co-operation in repeated games |
|
7.2 Co-operation in games with communication7.3 Co-operation in one-shot games; 8. The Regulated Common Property; 8.1 The efficiency of regulated common property; 8.2 The distributive effects of regulating common property; 8.3 Common property resources in the context of pervasive factor-market imperfections; 8.4 Conclusion; 9. Some Concluding Reflections on the Privatization of Common Property Resources; PART II: THE FEASIBILITY OF LOCAL-LEVEL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT; Introduction; 10. Were People Traditionally Conservationists?; 10.1 The romantic view: a first appraisal |
|
10.2 An interpretative Analysis of the available evidence10.3 Conclusion; 11. Recent Changes Affecting Collective Action at Village Level; 11.1 State regulations of resource use: their nature amd drawbacks; 11.2 Other recent changes on the rural scene; 11.3 Conclusion: A tentative appraisal of ongoing processes; 12. Conditions for Successful Collective Action: Insights from Field Experiences; 12.1 A general overview; 12.2 The problem of economic incentives; 12.3 The twin issues of group size and homogeneity; 12.4 The rationale and characteristics of sanction systems |
| ISBN |
0198290616 |
|
9780198290612 |
|
9780191601613 |
|
0191601616 |
| OCLC # |
191826591 |
| Additional Format |
Print version : 9780198290612. |
|
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