Return to home page
Searching: Muskingum library catalog
Some OPAL libraries remain closed or are operating at reduced service levels. Materials from those libraries may not be requestable; requested items may take longer to arrive. Note that pickup procedures may differ between libraries. Please contact your library for new procedures, specific requests, or other assistance.

LEADER 00000cam  2200517Mi 4500 
001    858764156 
003    OCoLC 
005    20131202122227.0 
006    m     o  d         
007    cr mn||||||||| 
008    130921s2013    cc a    ob    001 0 eng d 
020    3642382150 (electronic bk.) 
020    9783642382154 (electronic bk.) 
020    |z9783642382147 
024 7  10.1007/978-3-642-38215-4|2doi 
040    EBLCP|beng|epn|erda|cEBLCP|dGW5XE|dYDXCP|dOCLCQ|dN$T
       |dUtOrBLW 
049    OH1A 
050  4 QA76.76.I58|bC44 2013 
072  7 COM|x000000|2bisacsh 
082 04 006.3|223 
100 1  Chan, Chi-Kong,|d1943-|0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/
       names/n84108381 
245 10 Belief-based stability in coalition formation with 
       uncertainty :|ban intelligent agents' perspective /|cChi-
       kong Chan, Ho-fung Leung. 
264  1 Beijing :|bHigher Education Press ;|aHeidelberg :
       |bSpringer,|c[2013] 
264  4 |c©2013 
300    1 online resource (xix, 183 pages) :|billustrations 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
340    |gpolychrome|2rdacc|0http://rdaregistry.info/termList/
       RDAColourContent/1003 
347    text file|2rdaft|0http://rdaregistry.info/termList/
       fileType/1002 
504    Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0  Chapter 1. Multi-agent cooperation and stability. 1.1. 
       Semi-competitive multi-agent systems ; 1.1.1. 
       Characteristics of multi-agent systems ; 1.1.2. Two basic 
       solution concepts of coalition formations ; 1.1.2.1. 
       Social utility ; 1.1.2.2. Pareto optimality ; 1.1.2.3. 
       Drawbacks of social utility and Pareto optimality ; 1.2. 
       Coalition formation and game theory ; 1.2.1. Transferable 
       utility games ; 1.2.2. Non transferable utility games ; 
       1.3. Problem with the common knowledge assumption ; 
       References -- Chapter 2. Non-transferable utility games 
       and coalition formation mechanisms. 2.1. Non-transferable 
       utility cooperative games ; 2.2. Transferable utility 
       cooperative games ; 2.3. Coalition formation mechanisms ; 
       2.4. Belief and uncertainties ; References -- Chapter 3. 
       Two classes of stability--strong core and weak core ; 3.1.
       Coalition formation and stability ; 3.2. An example ; 3.3.
       NTU games with internal uncertainty ; 3.4. Opinions and 
       preferences of agents ; 3.5. The strong core and the weak 
       core ; 3.6. Effect of refinedness of agent opinion ; 3.7. 
       Application areas ; 3.8. Summary ; References -- Chapter 
       4. The b-core: belief-based coalition stability. 4.1. 
       Games without common knowledge ; 4.2. Belief-based 
       coalitional games ; 4.3. NTU games with private beliefs ; 
       4.4. The core, the b-core and belief accuracy ; 4.6. On 
       dynamic beliefs ; 4.7. Summary ; References -- Chapter 5. 
       Example application of the b-core: buyer coalition problem
       with beliefs. 5.1. Buyer coalition problems ; 5.1.1. Are 
       the utility really transferable? ; 5.1.2. How about 
       stability? ; 5.1.3. Private information in buyer coalition
       ; 5.1.4. Existing approaches ; 5.1.5. A new approach ; 
       5.2. Background of buyer coalition problem ; 5.2.1. Unit 
       price schedule and agent preference ; 5.2.1.1. Two 
       assumptions ; 5.2.1.2. Bids and agents' preferences ; 
       5.2.2. Agent beliefs ; 5.2.3. NTU buyer coalition games ; 
       5.2.4. Properties of the b-core in NTU-buyer games ; 
       5.2.5. On mechanism design ; 5.3. A distributed mechanism 
       ; 5.3.1. Distributed non-transferable utility coalition 
       formation mechanism ; 5.3.2. An example of the mechanism ;
       5.4. Experiment ; 5.4.1. Performance of the mechanism ; 
       5.4.2. Evidence of incentive compatibility ; 5.5. Summary 
       ; References -- Chapter 6. The complete picture: sb-core 
       and wb-core. 6.1. Uncertain opinion and private beliefs ; 
       6.2. An illustrating example ; 6.3. NTU-BU games ; 6.3.1. 
       Preferences and beliefs in NTU-BU games ; 6.3.2. NTU-BU 
       games stability ; 6.3.2.1. Objections in NTU-BU games ; 
       6.3.2.2. wb-core and sb-cores ; 6.4. Properties ; 6.4.1. 
       Relationships of the four criteria ; 6.4.2. Effect of 
       refinedness ; 6.4.3. Effect of accuracy ; 6.5. Summary ; 
       References -- Chapter 7. Conclusion. 7.1. New solution 
       concepts for belief-based NTU games ; 7.2. The future ; 
       References -- Book references -- Index. 
520    Belief-based Stability in Coalition Formation with 
       Uncertainty An Intelligent Agents' Perspective discusses 
       coalition stability. It extends the classic stability 
       concept of the non-transferable utility core by proposing 
       new belief-based stability criteria under uncertainty, and
       illustrates how the new concept can be used to analyze the
       stability of a new type of belief-based coalition 
       formation game. The book is intended for graduate students,
       engineers, and researchers in the field of artificial 
       intelligence and computer science. Chi-kong Chan is a 
       laboratory manager and a visiting lecturer at the Hong 
       Kong Polytechnic University, China; Ho-fung Leung is a 
       Professor and the Chairman of Department of Computer 
       Science and Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong 
       Kong, China. 
588    Description based on print version record. 
650  0 Coalitions|0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh85027419|xMathematical models.|0http://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/subjects/sh2002007921 
650  0 Game theory.|0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh85052941 
650  0 Multiagent systems.|0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/
       subjects/sh2009010910 
700 1  Leung, Ho-Fung.|0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/
       no94009699 
710 2  Ohio Library and Information Network.|0http://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/names/no95058981 
773 0  |tSpringerLink|w(OCoLC)43927870. 
773 0  |tOhioLINK electronic book center (Online)
       |w(OCoLC)180989150. 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aChan, Chi-kong.|tBelief-based Stability 
       in Coalition Formation with Uncertainty : An Intelligent 
       Agents' Perspective.|dDordrecht : Springer, ©2013
       |z9783642382147. 
LOCATION CALL # STATUS MESSAGE
 OHIOLINK SPRINGER EBOOKS    ONLINE  
View online

If you experience difficulty accessing or navigating this content, please contact the OPAL Support Team