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Title Economics and computation : an introduction to algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and fair division / Jorg Rothe, editor ; illustrations by Irene Rothe.
Imprint Heidelberg : Springer, [2015]

View online
View online
Series Springer texts in business and economics, 2192-4333
Springer texts in business and economics. 2192-4333
Subject Economics, Mathematical.
Game theory.
Alt Name Rothe, Jörg,
Rothe, Irene,
Description 1 online resource (xiii, 612 pages) : illustrations (some color).
Bibliography Note Includes bibliographical references and index.
Contents Intro; Foreword by Matthew O. Jackson and Yoav Shoham; Preface by the Editor; Contents; Contributors; Chapter 1 Playing, Voting, and Dividing; 1.1 Playing; 1.1.1 Noncooperative Game Theory; 1.1.2 Cooperative Game Theory; 1.2 Voting; 1.2.1 Preference Aggregation by Voting; 1.2.2 Manipulative Actions in Single-Peaked Societies; 1.2.3 Judgment Aggregation; 1.3 Dividing; 1.3.1 Cake-cutting: Fair Division of Divisible Goods; 1.3.2 Fair Division of Indivisible Goods; 1.3.3 A Brief Digression to Single-Item Auctions; Classification; English Auction; Dutch Auction Vickrey Auction1.3.3.5 American Auction; Expected Revenue; 1.4 Some Literature Pointers; 1.5 A Brief Digression to Computational Complexity; 1.5.1 Some Foundations of Complexity Theory; Turing Machines and Complexity Measures; The Complexity Classes P and NP; Upper and Lower Bounds; 1.5.2 The Satisfiability Problem of Propositional Logic; Definitions; Upper Bounds for SAT; How to Prove Lower Bounds: Reducibility and Hardness; Some Background on Approximation Theory; 1.5.3 A Brief Compendium of Complexity Classes Polynomial Space1.5.3.2 The Polynomial Hierarchy; DP: the Second Level of the Boolean Hierarchy over NP; Probabilistic Polynomial Time; Overview; And Now, Finally, . . .; Part I Playing Successfully; Chapter 2 Noncooperative Game Theory; 2.1 Foundations; 2.1.1 Normal Form, Dominant Strategies, and Equilibria; The Prisoners' Dilemma; Noncooperative Games in Normal Form; Dominant Strategies; Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies; Relations between Solution Concepts; 2.1.2 Further Two-Player Games The Battle of the Sexes2.1.2.2 The Chicken Game; The Penalty Game; The Paper-Rock-Scissors Game; The Guessing Numbers Game; 2.2 Nash Equilibria in Mixed Strategies; 2.2.1 Definition and Application to Two-Player Games; Definition of Nash Equilibria in Mixed Strategies; The Penalty Game; The Paper-Rock-Scissors Game; The Battle of the Sexes; The Chicken Game; The Prisoners' Dilemma; Overview of Some Properties of Some Two-Player Games; 2.2.2 Existence of Nash Equilibria in Mixed Strategies Definition of Some Notions from Mathematical Topology2.2.2.2 Sperner's Lemma and Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem; Nash's Theorem; 2.3 Checkmate: Trees for Games with Perfect Information; 2.3.1 Sequential Two-Player Games; Game Trees; Tic-Tac-Toe; Nim; Geography and the Hardness of Finding Winning Strategies; 2.3.2 Equilibria in Game Trees; Edgar's Sequential Campaign Game; Nash Equilibria in Edgar's Sequential Campaign Game; Subgame-Perfect Equilibria; 2.4 Full House: Games with Incomplete Information
Note Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed August 24, 2015).
ISBN 9783662479049 (electronic bk.)
3662479044 (electronic bk.)
ISBN/ISSN 10.1007/978-3-662-47904-9
OCLC # 919201025

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