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Author Rausser, Gordon C.
Title Political power and economic policy : theory, analysis, and empirical applications / Gordon C. Rausser, Johan Swinnen, Pinhas Zusman.
Imprint Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Author Rausser, Gordon C.
Subject Power (Social sciences)
Economic policy.
Alt Name Swinnen, Johan F. M., 1962-
Zussman, Pinchas.
Description 1 online resource (xvi, 519 pages) : illustrations
Bibliography Note Includes bibliographical references (pages 489-514) and index.
Contents Part I. Political Power and Economic Analysis: 1. Public policy: the lens of political economy; 2. The Nash solution to the bargaining problem; 3. The Harsanyi solution to the bargaining problem; 4. Political-economic analysis; 5. Normative political-economic analysis; 6. Dynamic political-economic analysis -- Part II. Ideology, Prescription, and Political Power Coefficients: 7. Political power, ideology, and political organizational structures; 8. Political power, influence, and lobbying; 9. Constitutional prescription and political power coefficients -- Part III. Analysis of Specific Structures: 10. The political economy of commodity market intervention; 11. The political economy of public research and development; 12. Political-economic analysis of redistributive policy and public good investments; 13. Interest groups, coalition breaking, and productive policies; 14. Policy reform and compensation; 15. Political-economic analysis of land reform; 16. Political-economic analysis of water resource systems; 17. The political-economic lens on quality and public standard regulations; 18. Political-economic analysis in transition economies; 19. The power of bureaucracies: the European commission and EU policy reforms -- Part IV. Empirical Applications of Political Power Estimation: 20. Political econometrics; 21. The political econometrics of the Israeli dairy industry; 22. Flexible policy instruments given a political power distribution; 23. Estimating statistical properties of power weight parameters and their temporal shifts; 24. Role of institutions in the joint determination of PERTs and PESTs.
15.5.4 The Social Burden of Fiscal Expenditures -- 15.5.5 Rent-Seeking Costs -- 15.6 Conclusion -- 16 Political-Economic Analysis of Water Resource Systems -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 The Structure of a Water Resource Political Economy -- 16.3 The Physical Water Resource Sub-system -- 16.4 The Economic Structure -- 16.5 The Political Power Structure -- 16.5.1 The Central Water Project -- 16.5.2 The District -- 16.5.3 The Government -- 16.6 The Hydrological-Political-Economic Equilibrium -- 16.7 Conjunctive Water Use with Short Water Supply -- 16.8 Conclusion -- 17 The Political Economy Lens on Quality and Public Standard Regulations -- 17.1 Introduction -- 17.2 Interest Group Configuration -- 17.2.1 Producers -- 17.2.2 Consumers -- 17.2.3 Other Interest Groups -- 17.3 The Political Economy of Public Standards -- 17.4 Trade and Economic Development -- 17.5 A Dynamic and Strategic Political Economy Theory of Quality Regulation -- 17.6 Conclusion -- 18 Political-Economic Analysis in Transition Economies -- 18.1 Introduction -- 18.2 The Model -- 18.2.1 The Post-Transition Economy -- 18.2.2 Interest Groups -- 18.2.3 The Post-Transition Political Model: Choosing Distortion -- 18.2.4 The ρ -- δ Tradeoff -- The Political Effect of the Transition -- The Economic Effect of the Transition -- The Slope of the Tradeoff -- 18.2.5 The Transition Political Model: Choosing the Degree of Disruption -- 18.3 Restructuring the Inter-temporal Tradeoff -- 18.4 Open and Closed Economies -- 18.5 Vicious and Virtuous Circles -- 18.6 Structural Conditions, Communist Organization, and the "ρ -- δ-Temporal Tradeoff'' -- 18.7 Conclusion -- 19 The Power of Bureaucracies: The European Commission and EU Policy Reforms -- 19.1 Introduction -- 19.2 The Decision-Making Process -- 19.3 Status Quo Bias: The Importance of External Changes for Policy Reform.
Summary "This book analyzes the links between political economics, governance structures and the distribution of political power in economic policy making. The book theoretically explains and empirically quantifies these interactions. The analysis includes both public good policies and redistributive policies. Part I of the book presents the conceptual foundations of political-economic bargaining and interest group analysis. After presenting the underlying theory, Part II of the book examines ideology, prescription and political power coefficients; Part III analyzes a number of specific structures; and Part IV presents a framework for political econometrics with a number of empirical applications and testable hypotheses. In all four parts of the book, four analytical dimensions of public policy are distinguished: governance structures, political economy, mechanism design and incidence"--Provided by publisher.
Note Print version record.
ISBN 9781139127929 (electronic bk.)
1139127926 (electronic bk.)
9780511978661 (electronic bk.)
0511978669 (electronic bk.)
OCLC # 772458473
Additional Format Print version: Rausser, Gordon C. Political power and economic policy. Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011 9780521190169 (DLC) 2011017663 (OCoLC)714729255

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