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LEADER 00000cam  2200589Mi 4500 
001    893680454 
003    OCoLC 
005    20181116042403.9 
006    m     o  d         
007    cr cn||||||||| 
008    141016t20152015si a    ob    001 0 eng d 
019    904284842|a957614600|a959534447|a959647630 
020    9781119028161|q(e-book) 
020    1119028167|q(e-book) 
020    1119028175 
020    9781119028178 
020    1119028124 
020    9781119028123 
020    |z9781119028123 
020    |z9781119028178|q(ePub) 
035    (OCoLC)893680454|z(OCoLC)904284842|z(OCoLC)957614600
       |z(OCoLC)959534447|z(OCoLC)959647630 
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       |dSTF|dVT2|dUMI|dOCLCQ 
043    a-ja--- 
049    MAIN 
050  4 HC462.95|b.K66 2015eb 
082 04 330.952|223 
100 1  Koo, Richard,|0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/
       no95008954|eauthor. 
245 14 The escape from balance sheet recession and the QE trap :
       |ba hazardous road for the world economy /|cRichard C. 
       Koo. 
264  1 Singapore :|bWiley,|c2015. 
264  4 |c2015 
300    1 online resource (351 pages) :|billustrations (some 
       color) 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
340    |gpolychrome|2rdacc|0http://rdaregistry.info/termList/
       RDAColourContent/1003 
504    Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 00 |gMachine-generated contents note:|gch. 1|tBalance Sheet 
       Recession Theory -- Basic Concepts --|tGDP and Inflation 
       Fuelled by Growth in Money Supply, Not Monetary Base --
       |tJapan Fell into Balance Sheet Recession in 1990s --
       |tPlunging Asset Prices Create Balance Sheet Problems for 
       Businesses --|tJapanese Firms Rushed to Repair Balance 
       Sheets by Paying Down Debt --|t"Correct" Private Sector 
       Behaviour Tipped Japan into Contractionary Equilibrium --
       |tCollapse of Japan's Bubble Destroyed y1,500 Trillion in 
       Wealth --|tWhy Japanese GDP Did Not Fall after Bubble 
       Burst --|tFiscal Stimulus Saved Japan's Economy --|t"Good"
       Fiscal Deficits Were Not Perceived as Such --|tBalance 
       Sheet Recessions and the Limitations of Econometric Models
       --|tFiscal Stimulus Works in Two Stages --|tFDR Made Same 
       Mistake in 1937 --|tReactive Fiscal Stimulus Is Far Less 
       Efficient --|tFiscal Deficits Are Easily Financed during 
       Balance Sheet Recessions --|tSelf-Corrective Mechanism for
       Economies in Balance Sheet Recessions --|tTwo Types of 
       Fiscal Deficits Require Different Responses --|tFiscal 
       Deficits Must Be Viewed Relative to Private Savings --
       |tConsequences of Leaving Things Up to the Market in a 
       Balance Sheet Recession --|tGFC Triggered by Insistence on
       Market Principles --|tVolcker Understood Systemic Crises -
       -|tLittle to Be Gained from Bashing Those Who Have Already
       Come to Their Senses --|tRecovery from Balance Sheet 
       Recession Takes Time --|tForward Guidance Important for 
       Fiscal as Well as Monetary Policy --|tFiscal Consolidation
       : Better Too Late Than Too Early --|tThree Points to 
       Consider Regarding Costs for Future Generations --|tJapan 
       Had a Shot at Full Recovery in 1996 ... --|tConflation of 
       Balance Sheet and Structural Problems Extends Recession --
       |tDistinguishing Balance Sheet Recessions from Structural 
       Problems and Financial Crises --|tDemocracies Are Ill-
       Equipped for Dealing with Balance Sheet Recessions --
       |tKeynes Also Overlooked Private-Sector Debt Minimization 
       --|tThose Who Prevent Crises Never Become Heroes --
       |tDemocracy Plus Balance Sheet Recession Equals "Secular 
       Stagnation" --|tAppendix to Chapter 1: Summary of Yin-and-
       Yang Phases of Economy --|gch. 2|tMonetary Policy and the 
       Quantitative Easing Trap --|tMonetary Policy Impotent 
       without Demand for Funds --|tMechanisms for Money Supply 
       Growth --|tGovernment Borrowing Drove Money Supply Growth 
       in Japan --|tEconomics Dogged by Incorrect Analysis of 
       Great Depression --|tJapanese Monetary Policy Has Relied 
       on Fiscal Policy for Past 20 Years --|tBalance Sheet 
       Recessions Triggered by Borrower-Side Problems, Financial 
       Crises Triggered by Lender-Side Problems --|tBernanke 
       Himself Says QE2 Unlikely to Have Major Macroeconomic 
       Benefits --|tReal Aim of QE2: Portfolio Rebalancing Effect
       --|tCan Higher Share Prices under QE2 Be Justified on DCF 
       Basis? --|tQE2 a Big Gamble for Bernanke --|tQE Undermined
       U.S. Leadership in G20 --|tQE with No Income Effect Harms 
       Other Countries --|tDollar-Buying Intervention by U.S. 
       Authorities Would Have Produced Different Outcome --
       |tInward Capital Controls Help Keep Bubbles Fuelled by Hot
       Money in Check --|tQE Represents Government Intervention 
       in Asset Markets --|tOperation Twist Lowered Long-Term 
       Rates, but to No Effect --|tOperation Twist Provided Only 
       Limited Economic Boost --|tBernanke Admits the United 
       States Faces Same Problems as Japan --|tFED Overestimates 
       Impact of Quantitative Easing --|t"Lower Long-Term Rates =
       Higher GDP" Formula Does Not Hold during Balance Sheet 
       Recession --|tFED Has Also Underestimated Costs of QE --
       |tUnorthodox Monetary Policy Distorts Signals from Bond 
       Market --|tNeedless QE Acts as Drag on Financial 
       Institutions --|tWhy FED Embarked on QE3 Two Months before
       Presidential Election --|tPost-Bubble Wage Growth Nearly 
       Identical in the United States and Japan --|tThe 
       "Inconvenient Truth" of the Real Cost of Quantitative 
       Easing --|tBOJ's First Round of QE Was Easy to Wind Down 
       Because It Was Conducted in Money Market --|tRedemption of
       Central Bank Bond Holdings Will Not Reduce Commercial 
       Banks' Current Accounts --|tGovernment Issue of Refunding 
       Bonds to Private Sector Would Absorb Excess Reserves --
       |tRedeeming FED Bond Holdings Has Same Effect as Issuing 
       Deficit Bonds --|tStrength of Private Loan Demand 
       Different at Start and End of QE --|tPaying Interest on 
       Excess Reserves Would Enable Rate Hikes ... --|tBut Cost 
       Could Be Prohibitive --|tCost of Winding Down QE Has Yet 
       to Be Properly Analyzed --|tDebate over Winding Down QE 
       Sparks "Bad" Rise in Rates --|t"QE Trap" Appears 
       Increasingly Likely --|tContinued QE Trap More Likely Than
       Hyperinflation --|tBQJ Found Itself in Same Position in 
       2006 --|tFED Admits That Supply and Demand Matters, Too --
       |tFED Changes Course Despite a 1.1 Percent Inflation Rate 
       --|tTraditional Phillips Curve Relationship No Longer 
       Holds --|tUpcoming Chapters in QE Saga --|tCapital 
       Injection Could Also Be Threatened If Blame Shifts to FED 
       --|tSales Should Start with Bonds Maturing Soon --|tFinal 
       Cost of QE Can Be Calculated Only at End of Fourth Chapter
       --|tTheoretical Debate on QE Has Focused Entirely on 
       Benefits and Ignored Costs --|tCentral Banks Should 
       Establish a New Reaction Function to Drain Reserves --
       |tEmerging Markets Need Inward Capital Controls to Protect
       against QE --|tJapan Should Learn from Pioneers in QE 
       Using Long-Term Bonds --|tFinancial and Capital Markets 
       during Balance Sheet Recessions --|tBalance Sheet 
       Recession Brings Special Kind of Liquidity-Driven Market -
       -|tIs Inflation of 1-2 Percent Too Low? --|tDoes Inflation
       Improve People's Standard of Living? --|tAbsence of 
       Inflation Concerns May Have Lifted Utility of Consumption 
       in Japan --|tQE Should Not Be Pursued Any Further Given 
       Difficulty of Winding It Down --|tQE a Problematic 
       Byproduct of Balance Sheet Recessions --|gch. 3|tThe 
       United States in Balance Sheet Recession --|tRating 
       Agencies Need to Be More Tightly-Regulated --|tWhy Was 
       Lehman Allowed to Fail? --|tTARP Prevented Bank Failures 
       but Also Created Turmoil --|tU.S. Authorities Changed 
       Course with "Pretend and Extend" --|tFiscal Stimulus 
       Shifts from "Three Ts" to "Three Ss" --|tObama Has Yet to 
       Disclose the Name of the Disease --|tBernanke's "Fiscal 
       Cliff" Warning Saved the U.S. Economy --|tBernanke 
       Declared Monetary Easing Could Not Offset Impact of Fiscal
       Cliff --|tFall from Fiscal Cliff Triggered Japan's 
       Deflation --|tU.S. Households Still Repairing Balance 
       Sheets --|tNon-financial Corporate Sector Faced Difficult 
       Years in the Wake of GFC --|tU.S. Companies Hit Far Harder
       by GFC Than by Collapse of Internet Bubble --|tCan U.S. 
       Corporate Sector Become Economic Engine? --|tLong-Term 
       Rate "Conundrum" Kept Housing Bubble Alive --|tPost-2007 
       Fed in Similar Position to BOJ in 1990s --|tFlow-of-Funds 
       Data Suffer from Poor Accuracy --|tBad Data Were Good for 
       Policy Debate --|tEstimated Correctly, Private Sector 
       Financial Surplus Continues to Shrink --|tRecovery in U.S.
       Private Sector Demand for Funds May Outpace Japan --
       |tHousing Market Strength during the First-Half of 2013 
       May Have Contained Temporary Factors --|tFed's Reputation 
       Falls to Earth --|gch. 4|tThe Great Potential of Abenomics
       --|tBOJ Already Had a Massive QE Program in Place --|tWhy 
       Didn't Japan's Institutional Investors Follow Their 
       Overseas Counterparts? --|tYen Fell and Stocks Rose 
       Because Japan's Institutional Investors Stayed in Bond 
       Market --|tHoneymoon Altered Japan's Economic Landscape --
       |tBond Market Reaction Ended Abenomics's Honeymoon --
       |tPrivate Sector Continues to Save after One Year of 
       Abenomics --|tJapan's Growth over Last Year Attributable 
       to Fiscal Policy --|tCan the Abe Administration Overcome 
       the Trauma of Balance Sheet Recession? --|tThe Trauma of 
       the Balance Sheet Recession Will Be the Last Effect to Go 
       --|tFocus of Structural Reforms Must Shift from Lenders to
       Borrowers --|tIs Japan's Slump Due to Shrinking Population
       or Balance Sheet Problems? --|tSlump in Domestic Demand 
       Was Due to Balance Sheet Recession, Not Decline in Working
       -Age Population --|tPersonal Financial Assets Have Already
       Been Invested Somewhere --|tCorporate Debt Pay-Downs 
       Weighed on Consumption and Investment --|tReal Bottleneck 
       in Japan's Economy: Lack of Loan Demand at Private 
       Companies --|tBalance Sheet Recession Has Taught Japanese 
       How to Be Frugal --|tIs Japan Really Closed to 
       Immigration? --|tJapanese Economy Would Cease to Function 
       without Foreigners --|tAgricultural Reforms a Major Step 
       for LDP Government --|tStructural Reforms Are 
       Microeconomic Policies That Take Years to Work --|tScale 
       of Structural Reform Is Also Important --|tWe Should Not 
       Expect More Good Fortune --|tKuroda May Be Trying to Close
       Gap between Expectations and Reality ... --|tBOJ and 
       Government Must Stress That Inflation Overshoot Will Not 
       Be Tolerated --|tBOJ Had Weapon to Prevent JGB Crash 
       during Balance Sheet Recession --|tNo One Has Criticized 
       Japan for Currency Manipulation --|tJapan Supported Global
       Economy for Four Years after Lehman Collapse --|tReal 
       Effective Exchange Rate Does Not Fully Express Japanese 
       Firms' Pain --|tRising Fiscal Deficits Caused by Change in
       Corporate Behaviour --|tHow Should Japan's Tax System Be 
       Reformed? --|tFiscal Stimulus Introduced to Offset 
       Consumption Tax --|tCurrent Corporate Earnings Based on 
       Massive Fiscal Deficits --|tWorking Down Public Debt Will 
       Require Bold Policies to Lift Japan's Growth Rate --
       |tIncentives Needed to Restore Japan's Economic Vitality -
       -|tMore Effective Land Utilization Could Propel Growth --
       |tJapan Needs Bold Tax Reforms Modelled on U.S. and Hong 
       Kong Systems --|tPolicies Need to Change Perceptions of 
       Japan at Home and Abroad --|gch. 5|tEuro Crisis -- Facts 
       and Resolution --|tEuro's Adoption Lowered Interest Rates 
       Sharply --|tMaastricht Treaty Acted as Constraint on 
       Credit Risk. 
505 00 |gNote continued:|tGreece Was Spoiled by Euro, and Germany
       Reacted Violently --|tGermans Believed Structural Reforms 
       Required a Crisis --|tGerman Balance Sheet Recession Eight
       Years before GFC Started the Crisis --|tGerman IT Bubble 
       Brought about Euro Crisis --|tECB's Rate Cuts Create 
       Bubbles outside Germany --|tMisunderstandings Regarding 
       Lack of Competitiveness in Southern Europe --|tMoney 
       Supply Growth Much Lower in Germany --|tGerman Reforms 
       Responsible for Only Half of Competitive Gap --|tGermany 
       Benefited Most from Euro --|tOne More Mutual Dependency 
       between Germany and Eurozone Periphery --|tSpain's Vicious
       Balance Sheet Recession --|tIreland's Household Sector 
       Forced to Pick Up Pieces after Massive Housing Bubble --
       |tIrish Businesses Remain Net Savers --|tPortugal's 
       Balance Sheet Recession Began Quite Recently --|tItaly Is 
       in Same Position as Portugal --|tWhy the Polarization of 
       Eurozone Government Bond Yields? --|tEurozone Allows 
       Investors to Buy Government Bonds of Member Countries with
       No Currency Risk --|tEurozone-Specific Fund Flows Amplify 
       Economic Swings --|tMeaning of "Fiscal Space" Differs 
       Inside and Outside Eurozone --|tMaastricht Treaty Is 
       Defective and Should Be Revised Immediately --|tIn 
       Practice, Fiscal Stimulus Requires EU and ECB Approval --
       |tBan on Buying Other Nations' Debt Ideal Way to Stabilize
       Eurozone --|tEfficiency Gains from Single Currency Remain 
       Intact --|tDifferent Risk Weights Should Be Applied to 
       Domestic and Foreign Government Debt --|tNext-Best 
       Alternative to Risk Weights Already in Place? --
       |tSeparation of Sovereign Risk and Banking Risk a 
       Rejection of self-Corrective Mechanism --|tJoint Issue of 
       Eurobonds Would Only Solve Half of Eurozone's Structural 
       Defects --|tDraghi Unaware That There Are Two Kinds of 
       Recessions and Fiscal Deficits --|tOutside of Greece, 
       Capital Flight Is the Problem --|tExplaining Balance Sheet
       Recessions to the German Public --|tEven Germans 
       Understand Need for Fiscal Stimulus If Properly Explained 
       --|tExcessive Focus on Fiscal Deficits While Ignoring 
       Growth in Private Savings --|tLack of Private Loan Demand 
       Biggest Problem for Germany --|tGermany Unlikely to 
       Announce Stimulus Package --|tDisadvantages of Euro Exit 
       for Greece --|tArgentina's Experience Also Suggests Euro 
       Exit Would Have Few Merits for Greece --|tGermany's 
       Competitive Gap with Other Countries Will Also Disappear 
       in a Few Years --|tDraghi's LTROs Prevented Collapse of 
       Eurozone Financial System --|t"Grand Bargain" with ECB Is 
       an Empty Promise --|tDouble-Dip Recessions and the 
       Eurozone's Bad Loan Problem --|tEBA's Lack of 
       Understanding of Systemic Crises Leads to Rash Actions --
       |tCypriot Bank Resolution Could Worsen Financial System 
       Jitters --|tVicious Cycle of Creating New Bubbles to Paper
       over Old Ones --|tEU Election Results the Result of 
       Economic Policy Errors --|tEuropean Policy-makers Mistake 
       Balance Sheet Problems for Structural Problems --|tPolicy-
       makers Need to Ask Why Eurosceptics Made Such Gains --
       |tDisappointment with Established Parties Led to Rise of 
       Nazis and World War II --|tContinued Disregard for 
       People's Voice Puts Democracy in Jeopardy --|tU.S. Voters 
       Had Policy Choices, Unlike Their European Counterparts --
       |tThe Euro Can Be Saved with Two Repairs --|gch. 6
       |tChina's Economic Challenges --|tChina's Local 
       Governments Began Borrowing en Masse --|tDecoupling Would 
       Not Have Been Possible in Ordinary Democracy --|tChina's 
       Remaining Problems Include Overcapacity and Income 
       Inequality --|tChina Understands Political Ramifications 
       of Inflation --|tChina's Shadow Banking Sector: 
       Misunderstandings and Realities --|tProblem: Sharp Growth 
       in Lending to Local Governments Post-Lehman --|tDecoupling
       of China and Developed Economies to Continue --|tProblems 
       Facing China's Economy --|tChina Has Already Passed the 
       Lewis Turning Point --|tRapid Economic Growth Continues 
       until Lewis Turning Point --|tU.S.-Led Free Trade Regime 
       Enabled the Emergence of Asia --|tEconomy Starts to Mature
       Only after Passing the Lewis Turning Point --|tLocal and 
       Global Lewis Turning Points and Inequality --|tChina 
       Increasingly Tolerant of RMB Appreciation as Transition to
       Consumption-Led Economy Proceeds --|tThe West Is 
       Conflating Problems of Trade Imbalance and Financial 
       Crisis --|tLiberalized Financial Sector and Capital Flows 
       Could Weaken RMB --|tChina Could Fall into the "Middle-
       Income Trap" If It Neglects to Advance Its Industrial Base
       --|tJapan, Korea, and Taiwan Escaped from Middle-Income 
       Trap --|tLabour Disputes Increase Sharply after the Lewis 
       Turning Point Is Reached --|tThe Dilemma of Patriotism 
       with an External Enemy --|tWorking-Age Population Peaked 
       Just as the Lewis Turning Point Was Reached --|tWill China
       Grow Old before It Grows Rich? --|tThe Next 15 to 20 Years
       Are Critical --|tUncertainty Due to Corruption and Lack of
       Legal Infrastructure Must Be Removed ... --|tAppealing to 
       Patriotism without Creating External Enemies --|tChina 
       Could Become a World-Class Nation for the First Time in 
       Two Centuries --|tChinese Ambition and Industry Must Be 
       Steered in Right Direction. 
520    This book details the hidden dangers remaining as the 
       world slowly recovers from the balance sheet recession of 
       2008. Koo explains the unique political and economic 
       pitfalls that stand in the way of recovery from this rare 
       type of recession that was largely overlooked by 
       economists. This text illustrates how history is repeating
       itself in Europe while the United States, which learnt 
       from the Japanese experience, is doing better by avoiding 
       the fiscal cliff. Because of the liberal dosage of 
       quantitative easing already implemented, the United States,
       the United Kingdom, and Japan may face a treacherous path 
       to normalcy in what Koo calls the QE trap. He argues that 
       it is necessary to understand balance sheet recession in 
       order to resolve the Eurozone crisis, particularly the 
       competitiveness problems. He re-examines Japan's two 
       decades of experiences with this rare recession and offers
       an insider view on the Abenomics. --|cEdited summary from 
       book. 
588 0  Online resource; title from PDF title page (ebrary, viewed
       October 16, 2014). 
650  0 Globalization|xEconomic aspects|0http://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/subjects/sh2008118201|zJapan.|0http://
       id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n78089021 
651  0 Japan|xEconomic conditions|y1989-|0http://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/subjects/sh90003616 
651  0 Japan|xEconomic policy|y1989-|0http://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/subjects/sh90003634 
655  4 Electronic books. 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aKoo, Richard C.|tEscape from balance 
       sheet recession and the QE trap : a hazardous road for the
       world economy.|dSingapore : Wiley, 2015|hxxv, 320 pages
       |z9781119028123 
990    ProQuest Safari|bO'Reilly Safari Learning Platform: 
       Academic edition|c2018-11-16|yMaster record variable 
       field(s) change: 505|5OH1 
990    ProQuest Safari|bO'Reilly Safari Learning Platform: 
       Academic edition|c2018-10-22|yNew collection 
       ProQuest.ormac|5OH1 
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