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EBOOK
Author Chamley, Christophe.
Title Rational herds : economic models of social learning / Christophe P. Chamley.
Imprint Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Author Chamley, Christophe.
Subject Social learning.
Social learning -- Mathematical models.
Decision making.
Collective behavior.
Add Title Economic models of social learning
Description 1 online resource (xiv, 402 pages) : illustrations
Bibliography Note Includes bibliographical references (pages 385-394) and indexes.
Note Print version record.
Contents 1. Introduction -- Part I. Social learning : 2. Bayesian tools : The bayesian framework ; Binary and Gaussian information ; Private signals and beliefs ; Martingales -- 3. Social learning with a common memory : A canonical model of social learning ; Efficient learning ; Observation noise ; Extensions -- 4. Cascades and herds : The basic model of herding ; The standard model with bounded beliefs ; The convergence of beliefs ; Herds and the slow convergence of beliefs ; Pricing the informational externality ; Crashes and booms -- 5. Limited memories : The sequential model with sampling ; The welfare-improving principle ; Sampling in a very large population ; Social learning or sampling in a large population? -- 6. Delays : The simplest model ; A general model with heterogeneous beliefs ; Properties -- 7. More delays : The length of a period ; Continuous times ; Buildup of private information ; Observation of payoffs -- 8. Outcomes : Incomplete learning ; The determinant of economic success: luck or effort? ; Complete learning with a diversity of private beliefs -- 9. Networks and diffusion : Optimization and diffusion of innovations ; Learning in networks -- 10. Words : Advice by one expert ; Larger sets of states and messages ; Panel of experts ; The receiver does not make the evaluation -- Part II. Coordination : 11. Guessing to coordinate : Overview ; Eductive stability in a standard market ; Strategic complementarities ; Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate -- 12. Learning to coordinate : A distribution with a cluster ; Observation noise -- 13. Delays and payoff externalities : Strategic substitutability ; Strategic complementaries -- Part III. Financial herding : 14.l Sequences of financial trades : Learning in the model of Glosten and Milgrom ; Herds ; Avalanches ; Herding in auctions -- 15. Gaussian financial markets : Actions in the CARA-Gauss model ; Markets ; The convergence of beliefs ; Multiple equilibria, crashes, and booms -- 16. Financial frenzies : Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate ; Information delays in financial markets ; The crash of a bubble.
Summary This book is the first in the exciting new field of social learning.
Note English.
ISBN 0511165978 (electronic bk.)
9780511165979 (electronic bk.)
0511165382 (electronic bk.)
9780511165382 (electronic bk.)
9780511616372 (electronic bk.)
0511616376 (electronic bk.)
9780511164828 (electronic bk.)
0511164823 (electronic bk.)
1280437545
9781280437540
9786610437542
6610437548
9780511164026
0511164025
9780521824019
052182401X
9780521530927
052153092X
1107146364
9781107146365
0511312865
9780511312861
ISBN/ISSN MYILIB_CUp
OCLC # 69404014
Additional Format Print version: Chamley, Christophe. Rational herds. Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2004 052182401X 052153092X (DLC) 2003046180 (OCoLC)51944425



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