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Author Danzon, Patricia M.
Title Vaccine Supply [electronic resource]: Effects Of Regulation And Competition / Patricia M. Danzon, Nuno S. Pereira.
Imprint Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2011.

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Author Danzon, Patricia M.
Series NBER working paper series no. w17205
Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w17205.
Subject Influenza vaccines -- Economic aspects -- United States.
Vaccines industry -- United States -- Econometric models.
Alt Name Pereira, Nuno S.
Description 1 online resource.
Note July 2011.
Access ]note: King's username and password for off campus access.].
System Details Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Summary In US vaccine markets, competing producers with high fixed, sunk costs face relatively concentrated demand. The resulting price and quality competition leads to the exit of all but one or very few producers per vaccine. Our empirical analysis of exits from US vaccine markets supports the hypothesis that high fixed costs and both price and quality competition contribute to vaccine exits. We find no evidence that government purchasing has significant effects, possibly because government purchase tends to increase volume but lower price, with offsetting effects. Evidence from the flu vaccine market confirms that government purchasing is not a necessary condition for exits and the existence of few suppliers per vaccine in the US.
OCLC # 1027255694

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