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Title After Saddam : prewar planning and the occupation of Iraq / Nora Bensahel [and others].
Imprint Santa Monica, CA : Rand Arroyo Center, 2008.

View online
View online
Series Rand Corporation monograph series
Rand Corporation monograph series.
Subject Coalition Provisional Authority.
Iraq War, 2003-2011.
Military planning -- United States.
Postwar reconstruction -- Iraq.
Insurgency -- Iraq.
National security -- Iraq.
Alt Name Bensahel, Nora, 1971-
United States. Army.
Description 1 online resource (xxxvii, 273 pages) : illustrations, maps
Note "Prepared for the United States Army."
"MG-642-A"--Page 4 of cover.
Bibliography Note Includes bibliographical references (pages 255-273).
Note Print version record.
Contents Military planning efforts -- Civilian planning efforts -- Task Force IV -- The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance -- Humanitarian planning -- Combat operations during Phase IV -- The Coalition Provisional Authority -- Building new Iraqi security forces -- Governance and political reconstruction -- Economic policy -- Essential services and infrastructure -- Assessing postwar efforts.
Summary This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
ISBN 9780833046383 (electronic bk.)
0833046381 (electronic bk.)
ISBN/ISSN 9786612033230
OCLC # 341234720
Additional Format Print version: After Saddam. Santa Monica, CA : Rand Arroyo Center, 2008 9780833044587 0833044583 (DLC) 2008025846 (OCoLC)232002125

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